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Introduction
The recent U.K. Government White Paper, Our Inheritance, Our Future
(2003), is interestingly sub-titled ‘Realising the potential of genetics in the
NHS’. The importance attributed to genetics and genetic services for the future
of health and healthcare in the United Kingdom is restated by the Secretary of
State for Health in his Foreword to the White Paper (2003, 5). Developing the
potential of genetics and genetic services is the ‘vision’ (2003, 5) encapsulated
in this document: ‘that the NHS should lead the world in taking maximum
advantage of the application of the new genetic knowledge for the beneﬁt of
all patients’ (2003, 5). This commitment follows the Government’s allocation
of £30 million in 2002, and is underlined by Dr Reid’s pledge in this document
to invest a further £50 million in England ‘in developing genetics knowledge,
skills and provision within the NHS.’The air of enthusiasm that permeates the
White Paper is, perhaps, unsurprising given both the assumption of beneﬁt that
genetics holds for healthcare, and the composition of the Advisory Panel, the
majority of whom have a direct professional interest in genetics and genetic
services.
Nevertheless, one cannot fail to recognise the excitement that has been
generated by the so-called genetics revolution even amongst those with little
experience in the ﬁeld. Equally, of course, this revolution has generated con-
siderable anxiety and concerns about its possible implications. While it may be
the case that ‘[g]reater knowledge of genetics will have a major impact of our
understanding of human illnesses and herald a step-change in disease preven-
tion, diagnosis and treatment . . .’ (2003, 7), the White Paper also recognises
that ‘there are difﬁcult moral issues raised by genetics advances . . .’ (2003, 7).
One of these issues revolves around the issue of screening of children, a 
matter raised in chapter 3 of the White Paper. Paragraphs 3.28–3.39 outline the
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strategy for future screening programmes and propose speciﬁc antenatal and
neonatal screening tests that are to be made available either immediately or in
the near future.
Screening programmes for genetic disorders
At this point, the difference between screening and testing becomes important.
The White Paper essentially covers both, without identifying or clarifying the
issues which may arise from the distinctions between the two. The results of
screening may be similar on occasion to those which ﬂow from testing, but the
intention behind each is different, as are some of the consequences. We feel that
this situation should be clariﬁed before we proceed to further analysis.
By and large, ante-natal genetic screening is population based, albeit carried
out on a selected population – pregnant women. It is, in our view, designed to
establish the occurrence of harmful genes within that population and has two
main objectives. The ﬁrst is purely demographic and this carries its own spe-
cial socio-political problems with which we are not, here, concerned. The sec-
ond is designed to control the ‘gene pool’ in the general population; as such,
and despite the unfortunate connotations, it can be described as eugenic. Thus,
the programme described in the White Paper, para. 3.31, bullet point 2, is
undoubtedly a screening programme. By contrast, the post-natal programme
described in para. 3.31, bullet point 1, is clearly designed to target individual
neonates and is, accordingly, better considered as a testing programme.
Similarly, say, the ’screening’ programme for cystic ﬁbrosis that is offered is
actually an offer to ‘test’all newborn babies for the relevant gene. This is more
than a semantic quibble. It is apparent that screening programmes as deﬁned
here have negligible impact on those who are children at the time they are con-
ducted.1 Genetic testing, however, as proposed in the White Paper, is aimed at
children and strikes at the heart of children’s rights.
Additionally, the problems associated with the identiﬁcation of disorders of
any sort can be looked at in two ways. In the ﬁrst, one can look at the practi-
calities and ethical principles that underlie screening programmes as a whole.
Many of the arguments both for and against such measures as applied to
genetic disease have already been well-rehearsed and we reconsider them
below. Alternatively, one can isolate speciﬁc genetically controlled condi-
tions and review the advantages and disadvantages of testing for them on an
individual basis. This is the route we intend to travel initially, paying particu-
lar attention to the conditions selected for mention in the White Paper (2003,
paras. 3.28–3.31); a consideration of these priorities may serve to disclose the
Government’s general intentions.
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It is, however, to be noted that the proposals are not uniform, in that they
involve both antenatal and neonatal testing – and, in some instances, for the
same condition. This is of major practical and ethical importance.
Antenatal screening has, amongst others, the speciﬁc objective of ‘enabling
more informed reproductive choice’ for women themselves (2003, para. 3.33)
but, as the BMA notes:
Prenatal diagnosis and screening, whilst often seen as an unquestionable good,
present parents with dilemmas which, with hindsight, they might prefer to have
avoided. The availability of information requires decisions to be made. Once an
unfavourable result to prenatal genetic testing has been provided, the woman must
make a positive decision whether to act on the results; ‘leaving it to fate’ is no
longer a neutral act. (BMA, 1998, 50).
Once having accepted screening, the choice is stark and, in many cases, lies
between continuing and terminating the pregnancy – and the latter is undeni-
ably performed on the basis of disability in the foetus.2 An antenatal genetic
screening programme can, thus, be seen as coming dangerously close to a
eugenic programme – one in which the political parcel is passed to the patient,
and one which, once again, moves the intervention closer to a testing rather
than a screening exercise, the anticipated outcome of which is also likely to 
be the termination of an affected pregnancy. Indeed, as Whittaker has said
(1992, 296):
[w]ith the availability of genetic tests, bringing an affected child into the world
could be construed by some as reproductive irresponsibility.
Neonatal testing, by contrast, is directed to the detection of established genetic
abnormality and, hence, to forewarning of possible clinically evident genetic
disease. As such, it is a process that is imposed on a non-consenting subject
and, given the current emphasis on personal autonomy as the mainstay of eth-
ical medical practice, this can be done only if it is in the subject’s best inter-
ests. These interests will, of course, vary according to the individual under
consideration. It follows that any speciﬁc test used as a screening procedure
must conform to analysis based on this principle.3 As we will consider later, it
is by no means certain that all genetic testing of the newborn will be to the
advantage of the developing child or of the adolescent or adult that he or she
may become4 – and this caveat is not conﬁned to the identiﬁcation of potential
late-onset disease.5
Looking further forward, however, we ﬁnd that the Government’s intentions
are rather more ambitious in that, in addition to spelling out its immediate pol-
icy, it ﬂoats the ‘long term’ possibility that genetic proﬁling at birth may be
used to create ‘a comprehensive map of children’s ‘key genetic markers or,
even, their entire genome’ (2003, para. 3.36, pp. 44–45). This, it is postulated,
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could ‘be used throughout their lifetime to tailor prevention and treatment
regimes to their needs as further knowledge becomes available about how our
genes affect our risk of disease and our response to medicines’ (2003, para.
3.36).
Certainly, the authors of the White Paper appreciate the concerns likely to
be raised by such a programme and the text speciﬁcally states that it would be
subject to ‘voluntary participation’ (2003, para. 3.37) – but this is impossible
from the point of view of the child who is being proﬁled. We address this prob-
lem in detail in the next section. For the present, we do no more than re-empha-
sise that a proﬁle is but the sum of its parts and, like it or not, the information
obtained from the individual tests is there for the rest of the child’s life, yet s/he
has had no voice in how, why, whether or when it is obtained.
In summary, the ethical repercussions of genetic screening and testing are
such that generalisations are seldom helpful and it becomes essential to con-
sider individually the inﬂuence that each inquiry that is recommended within
the Government’s programme exerts on children’s rights. We will do this ini-
tially with speciﬁc reference to those enumerated in the White Paper.
The tests proposed
Down’s Syndrome
The Paper commits the Government to ensuring that all women are offered
ante-natal screening for Down’s Syndrome. Given that a high proportion of
pregnancies in the UK are already screened for this condition, it is unlikely that
this recommendation (or the counselling to be associated with it) will gener-
ate much controversy. It must, however, be borne in mind that there are some
for whom such screening is objectionable in so far as it offers termination of
an affected pregnancy as a main option.
Looked at from a rather different aspect, the inclusion of universal screen-
ing for foetal Down’s Syndrome for all pregnant women as a ﬂagship intention
demonstrates what is, to us, a general element of inconsistency in this sector
of the White Paper’s proposals. It falls outside the general tenor of the debate
in that, save in the rare event of it being due to a translocation trisomy, the
recurrence risk is related almost entirely to maternal age. For practical pur-
poses, the community ‘gene pool’ is unaffected by the birth of a Down’s baby
and no treatment is available for the child itself.
The proposal is suspect on many other grounds6 but perhaps the most impor-
tant parameter lies in the ‘best interests’ of the foetus. Using current testing
methods, there is no way in which one can assess the extent of foetal disabil-
ity and a Down’s child who has no physical defects is probably perfectly happy.
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No matter how skilful is the counselling offered, the pregnant woman is, 
perforce, making a blinkered decision. The choice is, however, of the all-
or-nothing variety; a positive test can be ignored or it can be regarded as an
invitation to prevent the emergence of a disabled child. Down’s syndrome
raises, with particular clarity, the persistent dilemma – is a termination of 
pregnancy morally right because it is legally permitted?
Congenital deafness
It is expected that all babies born after 2005 will be tested for hearing defects
(2003, para. 3.29). The incidence of childhood hearing defect is about 1:10,000
live births (or 900 cases in the United Kingdom each year) of which some 
50% are genetic in origin; testing for the gene mainly responsible is said to be
economically feasible despite the small numbers affected.7 It is difﬁcult to
imagine that any parent would object to screening for a condition in which
early recognition is of major importance to the child. It is, however, to be 
noted that the test offered is purely physical and is not speciﬁcally directed to
genetic disease. It is not easy to see why this, otherwise admirable, project
should form so prominent a part in a ‘genetic revolution’.
Cystic ﬁbrosis
Cystic ﬁbrosis is the commonest autosomal recessive disorder in Caucasian
Europeans amongst whom the established disease occurs in about 1:2000 live
births. The White Paper states that work is in hand to offer cystic ﬁbrosis
screening to all newborn babies but, again, we have to question the purpose
behind this proposal. The ethical difﬁculties are two-fold. First, the gene can
express itself as anything from a mild condition to one that is rapidly fatal and,
second, the treatment is symptomatic and is largely conﬁned to antibiotic
therapy as and when infection arises. This is a condition where it seems that the
only result of a positive neonatal test in the absence of an indication for test-
ing is that the parents can be told that their child is likely to be unwell. It, then,
illustrates par excellence the dilemma that is inherent in post-natal screen-
ing – if feticide was a legal option were the test available in utero, why is neo-
naticide not available when a post-natal test leaves us in the same position? 
One wonders what is the purpose of the test since that option is intolerable?
Indeed, in 1997, a workshop held in the US concluded that ‘. . . . before 
recommending universal CF screening for newborns as a routine public 
health intervention, policymakers will need more compelling data about 
its effectiveness’ (1997, 16).
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The thalassaemias and sickle cell disease
Screening programmes for sickle cell disease and thalassaemia are being
developed (2003, para. 3.31). The recommendations are that, by the end of
2004:
– A newborn screening programme will be in place offering screening for
sickle cell disease. This will cover around 320,000 births per year and pick
up around 90% of affected infants
– An antenatal screening programme for sickle cell and thalassaemia will be
in place aiming to offer screening to around 200,000 pregnant women a year,
initially targeting areas of high prevalence for these diseases (2003, para.
3.31).
To speak of ‘a’ test for either thalassaemia or sickle cell disease is, of course,
to over-simplify the problem – there are variations on each condition, they can
be mixed and, to an extent, the severity of the disease is also variable. Again,
treatment is not of the disease but, rather, of the resulting anaemia – i.e. by way
of blood transfusion and management of any consequent iron overload. As a
consequence, the haemoglobinopathies particularly demonstrate the economic
paradox – the better the socio-economic conditions, the greater the economic
strain imposed on society by long-term incurable disease. The natural distri-
bution of the responsible mutant genes corresponds to a great extent with areas
of economic hardship; as a consequence, something of an ecological balance
has evolved. Improving the health care of the affected population – and, par-
ticularly of the infant population – disturbs this balance and can signiﬁcantly
increase the resource related problems of the responsible health service. As a
consequence, some countries have introduced essentially eugenic policies
such as pre-marital testing – and the effect, which rests on acceptance, seems
to depend, in turn, very much on how the programme is presented (Mueller and
Young, 1995, ch. 22). As a consequence, this aspect of the Government’s pro-
posals, which are essentially demographic and directed to health care planning,
merit particular consideration.
The ethnic distribution of the haemoglobinopathies is complex, but the
base-line fact is that they are very uncommon in northern Europeans. Both 
a- and b-thalassaemias are most common in Asian communities though the 
latter, in particular, are very prevalent in the Mediterranean.8 Sickle cell disease
is very largely associated with Africa and, consequently, the Caribbean, but it
also occurs endemically in Arabic countries and in India and Pakistan. It fol-
lows that, before any screening for these conditions is acceptable, it must be
shown to be non-discriminatory in its effect.
It must, also, be economically justiﬁed. The overall ﬁgures for occurrence
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in England have been stated to be 28–60 conceptions and 17 births of thalas-
saemics each year and 133–238 conceptions and 160 births with sickle cell dis-
ease but, clearly, these will not be distributed uniformly (Streetley, 2000.) The
White Paper expresses an initial intention to target areas of high prevalence for
these diseases but the mode of selection is not made clear. In a way, selectiv-
ity of this type raises its own problem – what is the purpose of testing for the
incidence of a condition if the areas of high prevalence are already known? It
has been suggested that universal testing of neonates will be more cost-effec-
tive than selective screening if there are more than 5 cases of sickle cell dis-
ease or 15 sickle cell traits per 10,000 births, (Streetley, 2000) but this begs the
question both as to the meaning of cost – is it the cost of testing or the cost of
treating? – and of effective – what effect is sought? Is it the provision of bet-
ter treatment facilities or is it the limitation of cases to treat?
In this respect, it is to be noted that the Government’s proposals are in two
parts – there is to be a neonatal screening, or testing, programme running in
parallel with an antenatal programme involving pregnant women, primarily, as
has been noted, in areas of ‘high prevalence’. Clearly, these have different
objectives. The latter can be described as a form of societal genetic engineer-
ing based on elective termination of pregnancy. The purpose behind the former
is more difﬁcult to identify. In common with many genetically controlled dis-
eases, treatment of the haemoglobinopathies is symptomatic and does not
have to be introduced early unless there is an already clear clinical indication;
and, again, the genetic karyotype does not necessarily predict the severity of
the disease. Many would question the value of ‘picking up’ 90% of affected
infants – there is no certainty that improved medical surveillance will not have
to be balanced against later, subtle forms of discrimination.9 And the shadow
of racial discrimination, whether actual or perceived, overlies every aspect of
this particular aspect of public health (Anionwu and Atkin, 2001).
It is, thus, apparent, ﬁrst, that few of the individual proposals satisfy our cri-
teria for acceptable genetic screening or testing and, second, that we ﬁnd it
difﬁcult to discern a coherent policy behind them. We address this latter prob-
lem in the next section.
Genetic Screening – The General Part
The controversy that surrounds both genetic screening and genetic testing of
neonates and children is only part of the wider debate that is concerned with
issues around discrimination, privacy and consent. As we have already inti-
mated above, many concerns relate to the possibility of discrimination which
might follow from knowledge of a person’s genetic status. The possible effects
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of this are vast and include not only adverse reaction in the public domain, such
as employment and insurance, but also wide-ranging personal impacts on those
found to have speciﬁc genetic conditions. As Robinson put it (1994, 726):
Although knowledge about genes offers beneﬁts, these must be balanced against
possible harms, like stigmatization, anxiety due to ignorance or knowledge of
genetic status, and discrimination.
Considerable attention has been paid to discrimination in the academic and
other literature. Wolf has suggested, however, that much of this debate is con-
ducted in terms that are too narrow to be useful. The rubric of ‘genetic dis-
crimination’, she says:
. . . ignores years of commentary on race and gender demonstrating the limits of
antidiscrimination analysis as an analytical framework and corrective tool. Too
much discussion of genetic disadvantage proceeds as if scholars of race and gen-
der had not spent decades critiquing and developing antidiscrimination theory.
(Wolf, 1995, 345)
She concludes that the real concern in this area lies in an ‘. . . . eagerness to
draw genetic conclusions, the search for supposedly deviant genes, and the
conviction that such genes actually deserve disadvantage . . .’ (1995, 347). She
believes that we would better understand what is actually happening when
genetic knowledge is wielded against individuals or groups if we were to
acknowledge the concept of ‘geneticism’, which connotes ‘an offensive and
harmful practice, which remains harmful even when based on accurate rather
than exaggerated understanding of the role of genes.’ (1995, 350)
Wolf’s critique has been considered by Hellman, (2003, 77) who proposed
that:
Whether genetic discrimination wrongfully discriminates depends on whether
such discrimination expresses that people with serious genetic conditions are less
worthy of concern or respect. (2003, 113)
Whatever their disagreements as to terminology and effect, Wolf and Hellman,
along with the majority of commentators in this area, do not dispute the very
real possibility that discrimination, however conceptualised, will ﬂow from the
availability of genetic information.10 The Government’s proposals to expand
the screening/testing agenda must take serious account of the non-scientiﬁc,
non-medical implications of so doing. Additionally, as has already been men-
tioned, the personal impact of discovering and/or holding genetic information
on a particular individual or group of individuals should be taken into account.
The Danish Council of Ethics, for example, pointed out that:
Just as persons found through screening to have a particular gene or chromosome
composition may happen to feel abnormal or outright ill. . . . so may others react
to the persons involved by giving them a wide berth. The detection of certain
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genetic traits can thus form the basis for branding certain persons and groups
among the population with the possibility of discrimination proper as a result.
(1993, 60).
Several authoritative organisations have commented on the problems associ-
ated with enthusiasm for the search for genetic information which underpins
the White Paper’s proposals, and have stressed the need for a careful approach.
Thus, we have the Royal College of Physicians saying:
The problems of gathering genetic information seem to fall into two main areas.
The ﬁrst of these concerns the problem of whether a particular investigation
should be undertaken at all. The second concerns the obstacles that may be
encountered once a decision to investigate has been made. (1991, para. 3.1)
The Declaration of Inuyama cautions that:
The central objective of genetic screening and diagnosis should always be to safe-
guard the welfare of the person tested: test results must always be protected
against uncontested disclosure, conﬁdentiality must be ensured at all costs, and
adequate counselling must be provided.11
and the European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine states that
genetic tests which identify a genetic predisposition or carrier status may only
be performed for the purposes of health or scientiﬁc research and require
appropriate counselling.12
It is clear, therefore, that safeguards – such as the need for counselling and
potential restrictions on the kinds of testing which are appropriate – are essen-
tial even when testing is proposed for those who are adult and, therefore, able
to consent; this being in recognition of the fact that taking a genetic test is dif-
ferent from other medical interventions, not least in terms of its non-clinical
consequences. Young children, however, and especially neonates, will be
unable both to participate in counselling and, as has already been emphasised,
to agree to or refuse screening or testing. Given that the welfare of the child is
generally the paramount principle when decisions are made on their behalf, and
given that there are prima facie reasons for believing that there are potentially
negative consequences from obtaining genetic knowledge of them, it is no
wonder that there is an even more profound debate in this particular area.
Genetic Testing of Children
We have observed already that there is generally a distinction to be drawn
between screening and testing, the former being population-based and the lat-
ter being directed towards the individual. At this stage, we turn our attention
to genetic testing of children with particular reference to its relationship with
children’s rights.
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In 1994, the Clinical Genetics Society issued a report entitled The Genetic
Testing of Children.13 This divided testing into three main categories – genetic
testing for childhood onset conditions, testing for adult onset conditions 
and testing for carrier status. Their conclusions on each differ, as might be ex-
pected given the kind of information being sought and its implications. In
respect of testing for childhood onset conditions, the report recommended 
(as Recommendation 1):
The predictive genetic testing of children is clearly appropriate where the onset of
the conditions regularly occurs in childhood or there are useful medical interven-
tions that can be offered (e.g. diet, medication, surveillance for complications).
However, the Society believed that there were sound reasons for not perform-
ing such tests in relation to adult- or late-onset conditions. The report said, in
recommendation 2:
. . . . the working party believes that predictive testing for adult-onset disorder
should generally not be undertaken if the child is healthy and there are no medical
interventions established as useful that can be offered in the event of a positive
test result. . . . formal genetic testing should generally wait until the “children”
request such tests for themselves, as autonomous adults. This respect for auton-
omy and conﬁdentiality would entail the deferral of testing until the individual is
either adult, or is able to appreciate not only the genetic facts of the matter but also
the emotional and social consequences of the various possible test results.
As to carrier status, the Society recommended (see Recommendation 4):
The situation with regard to testing children for their carrier status for recessive
disorders and balanced, familial chromosomal rearrangements is more complex.
In general, the working party would make a presumption against testing children
to determine their carrier status, where this would be of purely reproductive
signiﬁcance to the child in the future.
In response, the Genetics Interest Group argues that:
The report is overly preoccupied with psychological considerations, and the
harm that knowledge of genetic disorders can cause within families. With little
evidence, this seems to reﬂect more the fears of doctors that they will be held
responsible for negative reactions, rather than the needs of families . . . Whilst we
totally uphold the principle that families need counselling and support, we also
believe that they should be given credit for being responsible and having coping
capacities.14
These two reports highlight the tensions in this debate admirably. On the one
hand, there are those who fear the detrimental potential of genetic information,
particularly its emotional impact and most particularly where the knowledge
is therapeutically valueless.15 Similar objections arise when obtaining infor-
mation can justiﬁably be delayed until the individual concerned can consent or
refuse testing on his or her own behalf. On the other hand, there are those who
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urge the possible beneﬁt of genetic knowledge to the family – and, arguably,
through them, to the child. Indeed, the Genetics Interest Group claimed that:
. . . . parents are responsible for the welfare of their children and at the end of the
day most of them are better equipped to decide what is in the best interests of a
particular child, and the family as a whole, than are outsiders.16
This may be so, and it is certainly a tenable proposition, but it could also be
seen to miss the fundamental point. Most speciﬁcally, it seems to place the
interests of the family above those of the individual child. It may well be true
that families can both absorb and sensibly use information about the genetic
status of a particular child. But it is also true that children have rights, the exer-
cise of which should not be pre-empted precipitately. Certainly, the Genetics
Interest Group appears to concede this in respect of testing for adult onset con-
ditions (see para. 2.3):
The argument that testing of the child takes away their right to make an informed
decision as an adult overrides all other considerations. The low uptake in testing
for Huntington’s disease shows that many people would prefer not to know that
they will be affected at some time in the future.
Like many commentators, Ross (2002) agrees that a distinction must be drawn
between testing for childhood and adult onset conditions, even while conced-
ing that any testing may raise ‘concerns regarding the psychosocial implica-
tion of being an individual “at risk” ’ (2002, 226).
It might, therefore, be anticipated that genetic tests could be neatly divided
into two groups from the perspective of children’s rights. Those which provide
information which is therapeutically valid, and the discovery of which at an
early stage is, therefore, beneﬁcial, can be seen as being no different from other
clinical diagnostic procedures. By contrast, those which threaten the child’s
well-being – whether hypothetically or in reality – seem clearly to be disad-
vantageous, potentially rights-reducing and, correspondingly, impermissible.
But even such an apparently simple assertion of the shape of children’s rights
is not universally approved. Robertson and Savulescu (2001), for example,
debate the issue in different terms. First, in respect of predictive testing, they
identify three arguments which might be used against such testing. Broadly,
these involve:
– Failure to respect future autonomy
– Breach of conﬁdentiality
– Harm to the child
In respect of the ﬁrst, they suggest that it is incorrect to assume that childhood
testing necessarily reduces future choice. Rather, they argue (2001, 39):
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The child who is not tested is denied an option of growing up and adapting to the
knowledge of their genetic status during their formative years. Thus the choice
is not between two courses of action, one of which simply has more choice for the
later adult, but between two mutually exclusive futures . . .
It is unclear why a future that includes knowledge of information which may
have been rejected had the choice been available is the preferable option. They
also maintain that the conﬁdentiality issue is relatively insigniﬁcant, since fam-
ilies are already routinely in possession of sensitive information about other
family members.
Finally, on the question of harm, the authors conclude that there is a paucity
of evidence suggesting that children are indeed harmed by predictive testing.
Evidence on the point is, however, as yet equivocal, and merely to state that
harm might not accrue is insufﬁcient justiﬁcation for running the risk that it
may. Certainly, there is some evidence (albeit anecdotal) that people fear the
collection of genetic information and the uses to which it may be put. For
example, in a poll conducted for Time magazine in 1994, those interviewed
were equally divided on whether or not they would want to be tested to dis-
cover what conditions they may suffer from in the future. The British Medical
Association also notes (at 103) that:
Raised levels of anxiety, usually transient, have been reported in all forms of
screening programmes including cervical, breast, cancer, and general health
screening as well as genetic screening. For some people, simply receiving an invi-
tation to participate in screening causes anxiety and some people have been
found to be more anxious after screening than before regardless of the result.
Given such ambivalence, we wonder if what evidence there is of perceived
harm to adults should be extrapolated to children. Moreover, it must be asked
whether the risk of harm should be discounted when any alleged beneﬁts for
children are suspect, even if some beneﬁts may accrue to the rest of the fam-
ily. Moreover, the child’s situation is complicated by the additional dilemmas
surrounding secondary disclosure. The subject’s parents will have agonised
over the decision to allow their child to be tested. In time, however, they will
have to decide whether to pass on the information they have to their adolescent
or adult offspring and, in the nature of things, this decision must be taken irre-
spective of the wishes of the person most concerned. Thus, not only is the
pseudo-autonomy of the neonate invaded but so also is the actual autonomy of
the mature minor; at the same time, the chance of harm arises twice following
neonatal testing but only once in the case of an adult.
This takes on added signiﬁcance when one raises the further issue of privacy.
Although in the United Kingdom this concept has generally been subsumed by
the notion of conﬁdentiality, the Human Rights Act 1998 ﬁrmly introduces the
concept of private family life into the UK’s domestic arena.17 Although this
266 SHEILA A.M. MCLEAN AND J. KENYON MASON
CHIL 13,1+2_f12_254-272  5/27/05  3:39 PM  Page 266
right could be interpreted as providing support for the concept of family rather
than individual autonomy or privacy interests, the only evidence to support
such an interpretation stems, indirectly, from a case in the Republic of Ireland18
where the family is protected by the Irish Constitution as the ‘natural, primary
and fundamental unit group in society’.19 Here, the Supreme Court of Ireland
upheld the rights of the parents to refuse, for no obvious reason, a heel-prick
test on a child for the PKU gene. The decision was, however, based on Irish
constitutional law and the European Convention was not considered.20
Gostin, writing from the US – a country in which privacy rights are much
better developed – has noted the capacity of modern technology to establish a
‘comprehensive genetic information system’.21 Indeed, this is precisely what
is apparently envisaged by the UK Government in mooting the possibility of
genetic proﬁling. Para 3.36 of the White Paper refers, with little or no reser-
vation, to the possibility of producing a comprehensive map of children’s key
genetic markers ‘or even their entire genome’. While no-one could doubt the
entirely admirable intention to apply this to ‘lifetime prevention and treatment
regimes’, one is, at the same time, reminded of the furore that surrounded the
suggestion that identity cards should be introduced. As Gostin somewhat for-
biddingly expressed it:
While this technology can markedly facilitate research, screening, and treatment
of genetic conditions, it may also permit a signiﬁcant reduction in privacy through
its capacity to store and decipher unimaginable quantities of highly sensitive data.
(Gostin, 1995)
Yet such sophisticated systems would need to be at the heart of genetic
proﬁling – otherwise, the expressed aims of the project could not be met.
Threats to privacy may outweigh the potential beneﬁts of genetic proﬁling or
testing, particularly in the very young, because no system of storage or manip-
ulation of electronic or other data is failsafe.
Moreover, due to its indiscriminate nature, not everything that appears on a
proﬁle may be there for the subject’s beneﬁt. It is easy, indeed ‘trendy’, to decry
the slippery slope and its warning notices. The fact remains, however, that, if
a test can be done, it will be done and there is no certainty that the risk/beneﬁt
analysis of each new advance will be the same simply because each is classiﬁed
under the hallowed rubric of a ‘genetic test’.22
Finally, we must revert to the question of consent. It is axiomatic that
neonates cannot offer a decision on whether or not to accept genetic testing.
This, as we have suggested, is less of a problem when the test has a predictable
and effective therapy. Parents (or other legal guardians) are permitted by law
to make decisions regarding the medical care of their children, both at common
law and under statute. However, the right to provide a consent in these cir-
cumstances is bounded by the need for the decision to be in the child’s best
OUR INHERITANCE, OUR FUTURE: THEIR RIGHTS? 267
CHIL 13,1+2_f12_254-272  5/27/05  3:39 PM  Page 267
interests. This is a notoriously slippery test, and in the case of neonates has been
used in ways which on occasion seem to be mutually contradictory – one is, for
example, particularly reminded in the present context of the notorious case of
R v. Arthur,23 in which the parents of an apparently otherwise healthy Down’s
syndrome child simply did not wish him to survive and also of the numerous
Jehovah’s Witness cases where parents have imposed their religious views on
sick children for what they believed to be their own good.
It is, in fact, clear that some parental decisions may – as in the Irish case
referred to above – be less than self-evidently in the best interests of the child,
unless these interests are seen as being served by reference to the interests of
the parents and/or other family members. The arguments of the Genetics
Interest Group imply that the interests of the family are intimately linked with
those of the child, and this may well be so in some cases. However, given the
nature of genetic information and the uses to which it may be put, it is not obvi-
ous that the discovery of information about one child can be justiﬁed on the
basis of its beneﬁts to other family members. This problem might be resolved
were genetic information to become value-neutral, but there are few – if any –
who would realistically envisage this scenario actually occurring. Health infor-
mation as a whole is seldom value-free; it is even less likely to be so regarded
within the complex and predictive ﬁeld of genetic testing.
Conclusion
As we have suggested, the proposals in the White Paper can be subjected to cri-
tique from three distinct perspectives. The ﬁrst challenges the basis on which
the speciﬁc additional testing can be justiﬁed. The second demands a more in
depth consideration of the merits of testing as a whole. The third relates to the
implications of screening for genetic disease, perhaps particularly at the pre-
natal stage. Moreover, the importance of the protection of the human rights of
the young and vulnerable must not be underestimated. Many genetic predic-
tions are suspect even from the scientiﬁc viewpoint. Hubbard and Wald, for
example, have cautioned that:
Genetic predictions, whether they involve testing or screening, are based on the
assumption that there is a relatively straightforward relationship between genes
and traits. However, genetic conditions involve a largely unpredictable interplay
of many factors and processes.24
If so, then there are additional reasons why we should question the foundations
on which the presumption of beneﬁt to be derived from some kinds of post-
natal genetic testing – and, perhaps, speciﬁcally genetic proﬁling – are based.
Early detection of disease is generally regarded as a ‘good thing’, but this is
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usually only so when successful therapy or the alleviation of symptoms is 
real possibility. We have already suggested that – even in the cases speciﬁcally
proposed in the White Paper – this is by no means certain. The negative con-
sequences of obtaining the information may far outweigh any beneﬁts
achieved.
Secondly, we have expressed concern as to the link between neonatal and
ante-natal screening and testing. While the former may have at its root the treat-
ment of predicted conditions, the latter seems more likely to have – at least in
the current clinical climate – the aim of terminating affected pregnancies. This
may or may not be objectionable; there is no intention to debate this in this
paper, but it must be transparently and openly addressed in the public domain.
Simply presenting genetic inquiries as just another part of medicine’s capaci-
ties is insufﬁcient in these circumstances, and women (and their partners) must
be adequately informed of the possible outcomes of routine pregnancy screen-
ing in a way that, to date, we argue, they have not been.25
We believe also that the proposals in the White Paper should be scrutinised
carefully from the point of view of the general impression they give. It is imper-
ative that they should not be interpreted as an encouragement to selective elim-
ination of the disabled; but this remains a real possibility in the absence of
explanation and debate.
Nor is neonatal testing for the speciﬁed conditions an unequivocally ‘good’
process. Not only does there appear to be some confusion surrounding the
rationale for selection of these conditions, there are also some reasons to
believe that subtle discriminatory consequences may follow.
It must, therefore, be conceded that neither screening nor testing are ‘sim-
ply a neutral technique and a private issue; [they have] signiﬁcant social con-
sequences.’26 Moreover, as the British Medical Association (1998, 101) has
pointed out, the technical ability to screen is not sufﬁcient justiﬁcation for
doing so.
Thirdly, although screening of pregnancies is widely accepted in the United
Kingdom and elsewhere, the White Paper’s endorsement of it – with no appar-
ent justiﬁcation – arguably side-steps an important opportunity to re-evaluate
its underpinning rationale and bring it ﬁrmly into the public arena. Although
the subjects of such testing (the embryo or foetus) do not hold legal rights, it
is generally conceded that they are worthy of respect. The question must be
asked, and answered, as to whether or not this respect is adequately satisﬁed
by a steady growth of screening designed in large part, we would argue, to pre-
vent live birth.
Our main concern, however, focuses on the rights of children – rights to
which the mere fact of birth entitles them. These rights are not conﬁned to the
right to therapy; they also relate to the child’s role in his/her family and com-
munity. Despite Robertson and Savulescu’s conclusions, there is reason for
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concern about the possible effects on children’s rights of intrusive, non-thera-
peutic interventions, which, for example, would become reality were genetic
proﬁling at birth to become routine. Whatever else it may be, it cannot be vol-
untary, and this – coupled with the legitimate and plausible fears of discrimi-
nation – is a signiﬁcant reason for caution.
Our inheritance and our future may well be intimately and irrevocably
linked to the so-called genetics revolution, but for future generations, their
rights should not be compromised by our technological capacities or our inter-
ests in scientiﬁc inquiry. Commitment to intergenerational justice27 requires
that we do not compromise the rights of future children, and – as we have
argued – these rights are wider than the purely medical. Sadly, the assumptions
behind the White Paper’s recommendations seem to be deeply in the thrall of
scientiﬁc ‘progress’, and are less than adequately concerned with the conse-
quential issue of children’s rights.
Notes
1 That is, of course, provided foetuses are not included among children.
2 Abortion Act 1967, s.1(1)(d).
3 It is signiﬁcant that the two tests which are currently offered to a neonate – for PKU
and hypothyroidism (which is only rarely a genetically controlled disease) – are for con-
ditions that can be treated (using the word in a broad sense) and which, moreover, must be
treated early. Thus, there can be no question as to the best interests of the child and the tests
have been accepted without demur.
4 (2003) Para. 3.35 raises this problem in particular relation to multifactorial genetic 
disease.
5 For a good analysis of the already extensive American experience, see D.E. Hoffmann
and E.A. Wulfsberg (1995).
6 The overall incidence of Down’s syndrome at birth is of the order 1/650 to 1/700 with
a well-known association with maternal age – the incidence is some 1/30 by the age of 45.
We are not here concerned with the economics of universal testing.
7 Deafness and Genetics Forum UK, <http://www.deafgene.info/testing.htm> (accessed
on 30/06/04). It is to be noted that ante-natal testing for genetic deafness is not currently
undertaken.
8 In practice, a-thalassaemia is a relatively uncommon problem in the population as a
whole because it causes death in utero or in early infancy in the homozygous state and is
surprisingly asymptomatic in the heterozygote.
9 For a useful overview, see G.T. Laurie (1999(a)).
10 Although not everyone would agree; Maddox, for example, says ‘The reality of the
use of a detailed knowledge of the human genome in discrimination between people is. . . .
almost certainly more distant than the fear.’
11 Declaration of Inuyama (Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences,
17–22 July 1990) Human Genome Mapping, Genetic Screening and Gene Therapy, 
Article IV.
12 European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (Council of Europe
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human being with
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regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine) 164, European Treaty Series, Oviedo,
1997, Article 12.
13 A summary of its recommendations can be obtained at <http://www.bshg.org.uk>
(accessed on 27/06/04).
14 Response to the Clinical Genetics Society Report “The Genetic Testing of Children”
(1995), available at <http://www.gig.org.uk/docs/gig_testingchildren.pdf> (accessed
27/06/04).
15 This aspect of the debate is well argued by G.T. Laurie (1999)(6).
16 N. 14 above, para. 2.1, p. 4.
17 See European Convention on Human Rights Article 8.
18 North Western Health Board v W(H) [2001] IESC 70.
19 Constitution of the Republic of Ireland, Articles 41 and 42. This case is analysed in
depth by G. Laurie (2002).
20 Laurie suggests that Article 8 would not be applied in such a case due to the deroga-
tion permitted under Article 8(2) ‘for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others’
(2002, 138).
21 L.O. Gostin (1995, 324).
22 For the importance of a selective approach, see A. Barnicoat (1997).
23 (1981) 12 BMLR 1.
24 R. Hubbard and E. Wald (1993, 36).
25 P. J. Edwards and D.M.B. Hall (1992).
26 J. Black (1998, 45).
27 Declaration on the Responsibilities of the Present Generation Toward Future
Generations, UNESCO, Paris 1997. Article 1 of this Declaration reads as follows: ‘The
present generations have the responsibility of ensuring that the needs and interests of future
generations are fully safeguarded’.
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